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In this paper we develop an OLG model with heterogeneous agents,
money and bequests, introducing occupational choice and ﬁnancing
constraints when capital markets are imperfect. We show how, under
appropriate conditions, all the moments of the distribution are aﬀected
by changes in money growth. More precisely, if capital markets are
imperfect and heterogeneous agents are liquidity constrained, invest-
ment in ﬁxed capital is not eﬃcient and aggregate wages and proﬁts
depend on the availability of loanable funds. An increase in money
growth may imply a more eﬃcient aggregate investment. Therefore
aggregate product and wealth positively depend on an acceleration in
money growth.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Macroeconomic theory generally focuses on the aggregate consequences of
monetary policy, without considering its distributional eﬀects. In a previ-
ous paper (Longaretti and Delli Gatti, 2004) we have shown that, in an
OLG model with money and bequests, if agents were homogeneous, that is
in a representative agent economy, monetary policy would be superneutral:
output, consumption and wealth (of the representative agent) would be in-
dependent of money growth. On the contrary if agents diﬀered from one
another as far as income and wealth are concerned, the average levels of out-
put, consumption and wealth would still be independent of money growth
but the individual levels of the same variables would indeed be aﬀected by
changes in the rate of growth of money. In other words, the ﬁrst moment of
the distribution of income/wealth would be invariant to changes in money
growth (i.e. the distribution is mean preserving) but the latter would aﬀect
the second and higher moments. In fact by increasing the rate of money
growth, agents who are relatively poor in income/wealth become wealthier
whereas relatively rich agents become less wealthy. However, the relative
ranking is not reversed. As a consequence, while the ﬁrst moments of the
distributions of output, consumption and wealth do not depend on money,
higher moments are inﬂuenced by the rate of money growth. If the variance
is thought of as a rough measure of inequality, then inequality is decreasing
with money growth. In other words income and wealth distribution is the
source of a ﬁnancial accelerator since monetary policy has clear asymmetric
eﬀects.
In this paper we extend the original framework introducing occupational
choice and ﬁnancing constraints when capital markets are imperfect. More
precisely we assume the income heterogeneity is the result of an occupational
choice: agents may choose wether being workers or entrepreneurs at a ﬁxed
cost. If there is no credit for the entrepreneurial investment, when agents
are liquidity constrained, there exists a gap between the potential and the
eﬀective entrepreneurial share of the population. The occupational choice is
therefore no more eﬃcient. We show that in this context under appropri-
ate conditions on the parameters, money is not superneutral, in the sense
that all the moments of the distribution are aﬀected by changes in money
growth. The higher money growth the more eﬃcient the occupational choice
and the higher the average income and wealth. There exists a level of money
growth that allows all the potential entrepreneurs to eﬀectively undertake
2the investment project. Once the eﬀective equals the potential share of the
population, money only aﬀects the second and higher moments of the dis-
tribution of income and wealth and is superneutral at the aggregate (and
average) level.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present and discuss
the main features of an OLG economy with money and bequests. Section 3
focuses on occupational choice. Section 4 concludes.
2 The environment
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that population is constant and consists
of N young and N old individuals (of the previous generation) per period.
The i-th individual has (real) wealth (measured in units of output) ωit when
young. Output is perishable and therefore wealth cannot be stored to be con-
sumed in the future. For simplicity, preferences are uniform across individuals
and the young do not receive utility from consumption. Assuming intergen-
erational altruism, the well behaved utility function is U = U (cit+1,b it+1)
where cit+1 is consumption of the agent when old and bit+1 is bequest of the
old to the young (wealth of the young). In a monetary economy, in order
to consume when old, the young at time t sells its output to the old of the

















aggregate wealth. Wealth can be decomposed in income yit which the individ-
ual gets taking part in the production process as a worker or an entrepreneur
3(see below) and bequest bit
1
ωit = yi + bit (3)
Money is a means of payment and a store of value which can be carried
on from one period to the next in order to buy goods. When old, the agent
spends the money received when young Mit plus a money transfer propor-
tional to the average money holding ht ≡
Ht
N
, where Ht is the aggregate
money supply. Assuming that there is equilibrium on the money market in
t, i.e. aggregate supply Ht is equal to aggregate demand Mt,w ec a nd e ﬁne
the individual money transfer as:




0 <µ<1. The transfer is uniform across individuals while money balances
are not necessarily the same for each and every agent.
The old spend money to buy consumption goods and leave a bequest to
the young:
























= cit+1 + bit+1
(6)






is the real rate of return of money (πt+1 is inﬂa t i o ni nt + 1 ) . A c -
cording to (6) real money balances are spent either on consumption goods
or bequest.
1Matter of factly, a bequest is a monetary transfer from the old to the young whose
value in nominal terms is Bit.Therefore bit = Bit/Pt is the real money transfer (i.e. the
money transfer at constant prices) from the old to the young.






= Ωt. Dividing by N,w eg e t
ht
Pt
=¯ ωt where ¯ ωt is average
wealth2. Therefore, the real money balances of the old can be written as
θt+1 (ωit + µ¯ ωt) and the lifetime budget constraint becomes:
θt+1 (ωit + µ¯ ωt)=cit+1 + bit+1 (7)
In order to derive close form solutions, let’s assume preferences are rep-






with 0 < γ < 1. Maximizing (8) subject to (7) yields:
cit+1 = γθt+1 (ωit + µ¯ ωt)( 9 )
bit+1 =( 1− γ)θt+1 (ωit + µ¯ ωt)( 1 0 )
Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas utility function, both consumption and be-
quest are proportional to RMBi.





µHt. Hence the supply of money in t+1 is Ht+1 = Ht (1 + µ). Thanks to
equilibrium on the money market in t Ht+1 = Mt (1 + µ).
Equilibrium on the money market in t+1 is brought about by Mt+1 =







(1 + µ)=Ωt (1 + µ)
or, dividing by N,
Pt+1
Pt
¯ ωt+1 =¯ ωt (1 + µ)















. If (11) holds, equilibrium in the goods market is assured3.






(ωit + µ¯ ωt)( 1 2 )
Let us focus now on equation (3). For the moment income yi can be con-
ceived of as non-inherited wealth. In other words it can be thought of as an
exogenous variable. Later on, we will specify it as income earned by workers
(wages) and entrepreneurs (proﬁts).
The distribution of income across agents is the primary distribution, while
the distribution of wealth is secondary, i.e. derived from the former by adding
the bequest. As it will become clear in a moment, also the distribution of
bequest is secondary, i.e. derived from the distribution of income.
Averaging (3) one gets
¯ ωt =¯ y +¯ bt (13)
where ¯ ωt,¯ y and ¯ bt are average wealth, income and bequests respectively. We
can carry on the dynamic analysis in terms of income or bequest. Substitut-
ing (3) into (12) we obtain the law of motion of wealth:





(ωit + µ¯ ωt)( 1 4 )
3Aggregating the budget constraints, it turns out that the sum of aggregate consump-
tion and aggregate bequest must be equal to the aggregate real money balances of the old,






bit+1.B u tht =¯ ωt and Nht = N¯ ωt = Ωt.Therefore:
θt+1 (1 + µ)Ωt = Ct+1+Bt+1.If (11) holds true, then Ωt+1 = θt+1 (1 + µ)Ωt. Substituting






bit+1 . But income is part






cit+1 which is the equilibrium
condition on the goods market.
6Averaging (14) we obtain














¯ y +¯ bt+1
¯ y +¯ bt
¡
yi + bit + µ¯ y + µ¯ bt
¢
(16)
There is a mean ﬁeld eﬀect at work, here: individual bequest in t+1
depends not only on individual bequest in t but also on average bequest. The
mean ﬁeld eﬀect captures non-strategic interaction between the individual
agent and the rest of the population proxied by the average agent (see Aoki
1996 and the references therein).





Finally it is easy to prove that average consumption is
¯ c =¯ y (18)
3 Workers and entrepreneurs
In what follows we consider income heterogeneity as the result of an occu-
pational choice made by heterogeneous agents. Since birth, the i-th agent
is endowed with an investment project whose return is ρi. The return is
distributed as a uniform random variable with support (0,1).When young,
they make an occupational choice, which consists in being a worker or an
7entrepreneur. The young population, therefore, consists of workers and en-
trepreneurs. Both types of agents supply workhours to the “production sec-
tor” which produces output and sells it to the old of the previous generation
against money. This generates the income of the young, i.e. the wage of the
worker, which is ﬁxed at w, or the proﬁt of the entrepreneur. In order to
become an entrepreneur an individual must pay a ﬁxed cost r. Therefore, the
i-th individual, if entrepreneurs, gets proﬁt πi = ρi−r.Workers have the same
income w, while entrepreneurs’ income is diﬀerentiated. The old receive also
the money transfer. Finally, as in the previous case, the young receives also
ab e q u e s tbit. Output therefore is ωw
it = w+bit and ωe
it = πi+bit = ρi+bit−r
for the worker and the entrepreneur respectively.
Preferences are represented by U =( cit+1)
γ (bit+1)
1−γ. Therefore the





it, j = w,e. The old receive money transfers (Tit+1 = µht)
















balances of the old.
































and the real rate of return on money and money transfers are uniform across
the population, the occupational choice depends on the relative magnitude
of income obtained when young as worker or entrepreneur.
The individual becomes entrepreneur if πit+bit = ρi−r+bit ≥ w+bit or
ρi ≥ w + r ≡ b ρ, i.e. if his return is high enough to yield a proﬁth i g h e r
than the wage. b ρ is the minimum return on his project the individual must
have in order to become an entrepreneur. It turns out, quite simply, that the
minimum return for the entrepreneur is equal to the sum of the wage and
the ﬁxed cost. Since the return is distributed as a uniform random variable
with support (0,1), it is clear that w + r ≡ b ρ is also the share of workers in
the population. This share is constant and independent of money growth.
8The proﬁt of the entrepreneur πi is distributed as a uniform random
variable with support (w = b ρ − r,1 − r)w h e r e1− r is the maximum proﬁt





Within class inequality is zero for the workers (they all receive the same
wage), V (πi)=
(1−r−w)2
12 . Average income is
¯ y = wb ρ +¯ π(1 −b ρ)=
w2 +2 wr +1− 2r + r2
2
(20)
T h ev a r i a n c eo fi n c o m ef o rt h epo p u l a t i o na saw h o l ei sV (yi)=( 1−b ρ)
(1−r−w)2
12 .
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Figure 1
Let us deﬁne now the laws of motion. Recalling, as shown above, that
ht
Pt =¯ ωt where ¯ ωt is average wealth of the whole economy, and ¯ ω =¯ y + ¯ b
where ¯ y is average income and ¯ b average bequest. Average bequest is
¯ b = b
wb ρ +¯ b
e (1 −b ρ)









t + µ¯ y + µ¯ b
¢
(21)






w + µ¯ y + µ¯ b
¢
(22)









it + µ¯ y + µ¯ b
¢
(23)







πi + µ¯ y + µ¯ b
¢
(24)








¯ π +¯ b
e
t + µ¯ y + µ¯ b
¢
(25)






¯ π + µ¯ y + µ¯ b
¢
(26)

































































As to the impact of money growth on bequest, we know that an increase in
the rate of money growth is beneﬁcial for the relatively poor and detrimental
for the relatively wealthy. I ti sc l e a rt h a tt h ew a g ei sa l w a y sl o w e rt h a n
average income: therefore an increase in money growth always boosts the
wealth of workers. As to entrepreneurs, some of them — those with a return
which falls in the range ρ = y+r>ρi >w+r = b ρ — gain from an acceleration
in monetary expansion, the others — whose return falls in the range 1 + r>
ρi > ρ — loose. On average, however, money growth does not aﬀect wealth
(output and consumption). Therefore money is superneutral on average but
is not superneutral at the individual level. As a consequence, while the
ﬁrst moments of the distributions of wealth, consumption and bequest do
not depend on money, higher moments are inﬂu e n c e db yt h er a t eo fm o n e y
growth. In particular, monetary policy has clear asymmetric eﬀects: small
entrepreneurs bear the brunt of a deceleration of monetary expansion while
big entrepreneurs gain from it. However, average entrepreneurial income is
necessarily greater than average economy-wide income. Therefore on average,
entrepreneurs gain from a deceleration of money growth.
In ﬁgure 2 (see Longaretti and Delli Gatti 2004) we plot the primary
distribution (income distribution) on the horizontal axis and the secondary
distribution (bequest distribution) on the vertical axis. Moreover we plot the
income-bequest line which is upward sloping and parametrized at the rate





. Projecting the primary distribution on the income-bequest
line, we get the secondary distribution. In the ﬁgure it is clear the dis-
tributional eﬀects of money: as µ increases, the primary distribution does
not change, whereas the secondary distribution is mean preserving, whereas
its variance decreases. If the variance is thought of as a rough measure of




















In this section we consider a variant of the environment described in the
previous one. Suppose that capital markets are imperfect in the sense that
there is no credit market to carry on investment. In this case the agent with
a return higher than b ρ is a potential entrepreneur who can actually carry on
his project if and only if he is self-ﬁnanced, i.e. if bit − r>0. A ﬁnancially
constrained entrepreneur, i.e. an agent whose return is higher than b ρ but
whose internal funds are insuﬃcient to pay for the ﬁxed cost (bit − r<0)
must necessarily revert to the condition of worker. In this context, therefore,
an entrepreneur must not only have a relatively high return but also relatively
wealthy. A potential entrepreneur who cannot aﬀord incurring the ﬁxed cost
r falls behind in the social ladder and is lumped together with the working
class.












γy and is depicted in ﬁgure 3. In this case
the economy consists only of self-ﬁnanced individuals and the absence of a
credit market does not prevent the implementation of all the entrepreneurs’


























































In this case there are some potential entrepreneurs who must give up
the investment project, because of ﬁnancial constraints, and be workers. As
a consequence not all the agents whose project has a return high enough
to become entrepreneurs actually become entrepreneurs in the steady state.















y = e ρ (33)
will never catch up with the self ﬁnanced entrepreneurs. In the steady state
the wealth of entrepreneurs falls in the range (r,maxbe
i). r is the steady state
of the entrepreneur with eﬃciency ρi = e ρ.m a x be
i is the steady state of the

























14The average wealth of the entrepreneurs therefore is:
¯ b
e =

















where average income is
y = we ρ + y
e (1 −e ρ)=we ρ +( ¯ ρ































µ, C = 1
2 − r and D =( w + r). (34) and
(35) therefore become:
y = A − Be ρ (36)





Note that, according to (37), y is a concave non monotonic function
of e ρ, which presents a maximum in e ρ = b ρ = w + r. It is clear that the
eﬀective entrepreneurial share of the population must be non-greater than
the potential one. That is 1 − e ρ ≤ 1 − b ρ. T h e r e f o r ew eh a v et of o c u so n l y
on the decreasing part of (37), corresponding to e ρ ≥ b ρ. A c c o r d i n gt o( 3 6 ) ,
y is a linear decreasing function of e ρ. (36) and (37) represent a system in
two unknowns: y and e ρ. Graphically speaking the solution to the system is
represented by the intersection between the straight decreasing line and the








It is interesting now to pass analyzing the eﬀects of money growth. For
this purpose, ﬁrst notice that (37) is not aﬀected by µ, whereas it is (36).
Actually we can write
y = A(µ) − B (µ)ρ (38)
where ∂A
∂µ < 0a n d∂B
∂µ < 0.
Graphically speaking therefore µ reduces the intercept of the straight
line in ﬁgure 5 and makes it ﬂatter. The eﬀects of an increase in µ on
the equilibrium average income and the equilibrium eﬀective entrepreneurial
share of the population are therefore ap r i o r iambiguous, namely it may
happen either that y∗ increases and e ρ
∗ decreases or the other way around.
In ﬁgure 6 we plot the former case and in ﬁgure 7 we plot the case of two













() 1 , y ~ µ ρ
() 0 , y ~ µ ρ
























What we have sketched is relevant for consideration about individual and
aggregate superneutrality of money.
Proposition 1 When capital markets are incomplete, money may be non-
superneutral. Actually as far as average income is aﬀected by µ, monetary

























In the appendix we show a qualitative taxonomy of the eﬀects of µ on
y and on e ρ. Reasonable and to some extent necessary restrictions on the
parameters anyway allow us to uniquely conclude that:
Proposition 2 an acceleration in money growth increases the entrepreneurial
share of the population and, as a consequence the average income. Moreover
there exists a critical level of money growth that allows the economy to shift
f r o ms c e n a r i o2t os c e n a r i o1 .T h i si sµmax =2 γ
γr−w+wγ
1−γ−2r+w2−w2γ+2wr−2wrγ+r2−r2γ.
This proposition can be seen using the income-bequest line that projects
the primary distribution on the secondary one as we did in the previous
section. In ﬁg u r e8 . I tc a nb es e e nh o wt h em e a na n dt h ev a r i a n c eo f
the primary distribution increases as µ increases. This comes from the more
eﬃcient occupational choice. As µ increases, a higher share of the population
can eﬀectively undertake the entrepreneurial investment project. On the





























Proposition 3 Once scenario 1 is reached, y does not change anymore as µ
increases since the eﬀective entrepreneurial share of the population coincides
with the potential one, that is not aﬀected by money growth. The unique eﬀect
that monetary policy may have then is at the individual level, by reducing the
variance of the distribution of wealth and bequests, without aﬀecting the ﬁrst
moments of the distributions themselves.
The average income in scenario 1 is, in other words, the maximum average








19It is independent on µ.A s µ increases, the money transfer eﬀect al-




























5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have developed a model that investigates the distributional
and aggregate eﬀects of monetary policy. In a previous paper (Longaretti and
Delli Gatti, 2004) we have shown that, in an OLG model with money and
bequests, if agents diﬀered from one another as far as income and wealth are
concerned, the average levels of wealth, consumption and bequests would still
be independent of money growth but the individual levels of the same vari-
ables would indeed be aﬀected by changes in the rate of growth of money. In
other words, while the ﬁrst moments of the distributions of wealth, consump-
tion and bequests do not depend on money, higher moments are inﬂuenced
b yt h er a t eo fm o n e yg r o w t h .T h i si sd u et oam e a nﬁeld eﬀect which is at
work that captures non-strategic interaction between the agent and the pop-
ulation, proxied by the average agent, and makes money non-superneutral at
the individual level.
In this paper we have extended the original framework introducing oc-
cupational choice and ﬁnancing constraints. We have shown that, under
appropriate conditions, money is not superneutral, in the sense that all the
moments of the distribution are aﬀected by changes in money growth.
Heterogeneous agents as far as income and wealth are concerned make an
occupational choice. They decide if being entrepreneurs of workers. If capital
markets are incomplete and there is no credit for the entrepreneurial invest-
ment, investment itself may be ineﬃcient and the eﬀective entrepreneurial
share of the population may diﬀer from the potential one. Some poten-
tial entrepreneurs must give up the investment and become workers. In
such an eventuality, monetary policy may be a way to solve this under-
investment. An acceleration in money growth, in this context, increases the
entrepreneurial share of the population and, as a consequence, the average
20income. In other words, the money transfer eﬀects may be suﬃciently high
to allow the whole population to be self-ﬁnanced, so that the absence of a
credit market does not prevent the implementation of all the entrepreneurs’
investment projects. Once the potential and eﬀective entrepreneurial share
of the population coincide, monetary policy is eﬀective only at the individ-
ual level and no more at the average and aggregate level. An increase in
money growth reduces the variance of the distribution of wealth and be-
quests, without aﬀecting the ﬁrst moments of the distributions themselves.
As in Longaretti and Delli Gatti (2002), this result conﬁrms the stylized
fact that small entrepreneurs bear the brunt of a deceleration of monetary
growth.
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µw = y. y represents the value reached by the






µe ρ,w h e ne ρ = b ρ = w + r. Graphically





































23As µ increases, the straight line rotates around a point (Pint)w h o s ec o -










The taxonomy of the eﬀects of µ on y and on e ρ changes as Pint lays in
a r e a sA ,B ,C ,D ,Eo rF( s e eﬁgure A.1).
Moreover notice that:
e ρint > b ρ if w<
γ
1−γr
e ρint < b ρ if w>
γ
1−γr
This, together with the condition for scenario 2, implies that











. Therefore, scenario 2




γy ≤ 0, that is if y ≥
rγ
1−γ ≡ yint.
Graphically speaking it means that, if e ρint > b ρ, in order to be in scenario 2,
if µ is positive we have to select the equilibrium average income that lays
above yint. Symmetrically, if e ρint < b ρ, in order to be in scenario 2, we have





1−γr, therefore y<w , that is impossible, since w is the minimum
average income, corresponding to the case in which the whole population is
entrapped into poverty and is composed by workers. We conclude that e ρint
may never be lower than b ρ.
Let’s look for the values of w for which the intersection point lies above
the parabola. Formally we have to solve the following:
rγ
1−γ ≥ 1





2 .T h i si st r u ef o r
w ≤
−1








(1 − γ) ≡ w1
Let us now study the relation between w1 and
γ
1−γr.




1−γr for any r 6=1− γ
w1 =
γ
1−γr for r =1− γ . Graphically
speaking this means that the intersection point may lay above the parabola
only when e ρint > b ρ.
Note that, as said above, if e ρint > b ρ, equilibrium average income must be
greater than yint, therefore no equilibrium is associated with a positive rate
of money growth if Pint lays in D.
The conditions in order to Pint lays in E can be summarized as
24w2 <w<w 1 <
rγ
1 − γ




Pint c a n n o tl a yi nA ,Ca n di nB .
As far as the results we got till now, what we can conclude is only a
taxonomy of the qualitative eﬀects of a change of money growth.
If Pint lays in F, an increase in money growth implies an increase of
the eﬀective entrepreneurial share of the population and, as a consequence,
an increase of the equilibrium average income. As µ reaches the value
µmax =2 γ
γr−w+wγ
1−γ−2r+w2−w2γ+2wr−2wrγ+r2−r2γ,t h ee ﬀective share of the popu-
lation coincides with the potential one and scenario 2 changes into scenario




and the increase in money growth only reduces the variance of the distribu-
tion of wealth and bequests.
If Pint lays in E and µ<µ max, there exist two equilibria and an increase
in money growth implies opposite eﬀects on the two equilibria (look at ﬁgure
6).
If instead Pint lays in E and µ>µ max, there exists a unique equilibrium
a n da ni n c r e a s ei nm o n e yg r o w t hr e d u c e st h ee ﬀective entrepreneurial share
of the population and the equilibrium average income.
In what follows we study the probability Pint eﬀectively lays in F or in E.
In the following pictures, we plot
γr
1−γ (the straight line), w1 (the solid curve)
and w2 (the dash curve), with respect to r, according to diﬀerent values of
γ. F correspond to the area between the straight line and the solid curve,
whereas E to the area between the solid and the dash curve. The ﬁrst picture
corresponds to γ =0 .6, the second to γ =0 .4, the third to γ =0 .3
























We can see how the probability Pint lays in E reduces as γ decreases, but
we can say more if we impose a restriction on r. Actually r represents the cost
26on the entrepreneurial project. In order the net return from the investment
is positive at least for the most eﬃcient entrepreneur, r must be lower than
1. If we look at the previous graphs with this new restriction then area E
almost disappears, moreover the net return from the investment for the most
eﬃcient entrepreneur must be not only positive, but also greater that the
return the agent gets becoming a worker, that is w. Actually, if this does not
hold, the potential entrepreneurial share of the population is zero. Formally
b ρ ≡ w+r<1, that implies r<1−w.As u ﬃciently high level of w therefore
implies that the probability Pint lays in E is zero.
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